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Gadaffi during the Libyan civil war, operations to disrupt the Iranian nuclear programme, cyber operations against terrorists and organised criminals, and efforts to discredit Argentina through circulating false propaganda and implanting computer viruses. 2 Meanwhile, David Cameron sanctioned the use of Special Forces in Libya, Iraq and Syriaand was keen to use them in Algeria and Mali too. Through official documents, whistleblowers, press reports, and interviews -and a rigorous methodological process of source triangulation -it is possible to move beyond the realms of speculation and uncover a surprising amount of detail on such activity.
Nonetheless, scholarship on covert action inevitably suffers, owing to intense secrecy, from greater epistemological fragility, or uncertainty around what we can and cannot know, than studies of other means of policy execution. E.H. Carr famously wrote that history 'has been called an enormous jig-saw with a lot of missing parts'; 3 but when it comes to covert action, scholars have to deal with misleading, as well as plenty of missing, pieces whilst simultaneously lacking an overall picture to guide their efforts. It is a world, to use Donald Rumsfeld's famous, if clumsy, phrase, of known unknowns and unknown unknowns.
Covert action scholarship, also suffers an evidence bias. Paramilitary-type special operations often receive the most press and parliamentary attention -unsurprising given that they are among the more tangible and dramatic forms of deniable interventionism. However, this bias belies a range of nebulous and more subtle covert action existing further below the radar. 4 Importantly, such issues do not mean that covert action should automatically be excluded from academic inquiry. Far from it: the inherent controversy, frequency, risk, and appeal of covert action make it too important to ignore. Guided by the available evidence, this article perhaps inevitably focuses on paramilitary-type special operations -although it does discuss covert propaganda, technical, and influence operations in detail where possible. However, this should not be taken to imply that Special Forces activity necessarily outweighs less tangible operations.
Interrogating when, how, and why Britain has used covert action since 2010, this article argues that contemporary covert action has emerged from, and is shaped by, a specific context. After revealing British understandings for the first time, 5 it highlights three areas -ideational, functional, and bureaucratic -that enable covert action to flourish. First, the United Kingdom seeks to maintain a global role -a powerful idea long driving foreign policy -but is constrained by economic, military, and political factors. This creates a gap between perceived responsibilities and actual capabilities (or a responsibility/capability disconnect). Intelligence and Special Forces actors have long been seen as a useful means of resolving this divide between ideational constructions of the global role and the material reality of decline. As constraints increase, the disconnect remains in place today -leaving covert action an appealing option. However, with the (rare) exception of the Intelligence and Security Committee, senior politicians do not publicly refer to covert action. By identifying and unpacking their language, and the assumptions therein, discourse analysis of statements and documents can be useful in demonstrating this appeal. Key language, or textual markers, includes using intelligence actors to 'disrupt', 'influence', 'project power', etc. 6 Second, and functionally, intelligence actors play an active role in international relations. Increasingly in confluence with Special Forces, they engage in disruptive action to prevent or "fix" threats. This is driven by the environment in which they are now operating, the threats they are facing, and moves towards 'fusion' or 'jointery' within British security planning. Third, the domestic bureaucratic environment is conducive to covert action: legislation permits such activity; fora exist to task and coordinate covert action; whilst questions remain over the strength of ex post facto oversight. This article highlights the relationship between internal and external, and ideational and material factors in British use of covert action. 7 Importantly, it argues that contemporary trends in covert action consist of smaller scale, tactical, and disruptive operations. Available evidence suggests that covert action is not seeing a return to ambitious coups and regime change activity which, as a point of comparison, existed during the early Cold War and the era of decolonisation. British involvement in attempts (some more successful than others) to install new leaders in Albania, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, and Oman is a thing of the past. In fact, sceptics believe that the twenty-first century provides a less permissive environment for covert action altogether than during the Cold War. 8 This article challenges such assumptions by arguing that, whilst the current environment may be less permissive for ambitious operations, it is actually more permissive for disruption and "fixing". This article contends that, rightly or wrongly, policymakers are turning to the covert toolkit, especially at the tactical level, to meet contemporary security challenges. 9 Indeed, rather than taking a normative stance by critiquing the effectiveness or legitimacy of covert action in detail, this article seeks to shed light on "a missing dimension" of British policy and explain its contemporary appeal sometimes regardless of debates over operational efficacy (which is notoriously difficult to judge) altogether.
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the surrounding secrecy, current debates about Britain's foreign and defence policy have consistently overlooked the issue of covert action.
This is important; for it means that an often controversial means of interventionism is going unacknowledged and facing little discussion from academics, commentators, and policymakers. Trends in recent defence literature acknowledge that flexibility is crucial in an uncertain international environment, 10 that the defence community is moving towards "jointery" and integrated full-spectrum capabilities, 11 and that the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) amounted to a missed opportunity to offer a coherent approach bringing 'together ends, ways, and means.' 12 However, the literature stops short of considering the role of covert action -despite its clear relevance -within this. Debates around current British capabilities and policy, whilst acknowledging a 'strategic deficit' and the need for 'other instruments of national power', rarely consider deniable interventions; 13 and this is despite the literature recognising the longstanding 'predisposition of British defence officials to seek panaceas to age-old problems.' 14 Special Forces have attracted some academic attention; with scholars recognising their growing role in countering contemporary -especially asymmetric or irregularthreats. 15 Much of this, however, is disconnected from the aforementioned debates: it has been either from a specifically American perspective (which separates military special operations from covert action), 16 or from a strategic studies perspective (which isolates Special Forces from intelligence, examining them instead in relation to conventional forces, and which focuses predominantly on their specific military value). 17 The American system has tried to define and strictly delineate covert action and Special Forces. A deniable operation is a covert action (requiring a presidential finding and notification of congressional oversight committees) when it does not take place in a military -or anticipated military -environment. 25 By contrast, the UK context, which is free from the thicket of rules and regulations engulfing Washington after myriad scandals over the past 60 years, allows policymakers to use national assets more freely as they see fit. 26 As a result, and given that SIS lacks a paramilitary capability and operates closely with the military, the line is particularly blurred. Back in the 1980s British understandings of Special Forces encompassed covert action, 27 and the Army today refers to 'shaping operations […] through covert action by special units.' 28 Combined with recent moves towards fusion of intelligence and Special Forces capabilities, 29 this article therefore considers both covert action and Special Forces together. Whilst acknowledging the conceptual differences, it is primarily focussed on deniable interventionism. Finally, and further illustrating decentralisation, GCHQ also now plays a large role in British covert action capabilities too. In the British tradition, covert action, given its breadth and decentralised nature, is understood by means rather than actor. The skills of these various actors form an increasingly appealing toolkit for policymakers, for reasons discussed in the next section. As constructivist scholars have argued, the way in which policy elites perceived their obligations was vital to the way Britain constructed its policies. 37 However, Britain's ability to maintain a global role is severely hampered by various constraints, creating a gap between the perception or idea and the reality. The most prominent among these is perhaps economics. Indeed, the shadow of severe austerity has loomed heavily over recent security reviews. 38 The 2010 SDSR emphasised 'tough choices to bring the defence budget back to balance.' 39 Five years later, Michael Fallon, the Defence Secretary, warned the 2015 version 'will be, quite properly, aligned with the spending review because defence, to be deliverable, has to be affordable.' 40 And the opening lines of David Cameron's foreword did not disappoint: 'Our national security depends on our economic security, and vice versa.' 41 The 2015 autumn spending review involved a better-than-expected outcome for the This is not a new problem. Britain has long been in decline, yet desired a global role.
Successive governments (of all colours) have continuously turned to intelligence and Special
Forces to shape events and perpetuate the global role idea though smoke, mirrors, and fancy footwork. Examination of the declassified historical record offers voluminous examples of governments, from Clement Attlee onwards, resorting to covert action in these circumstances. 55 Despite its inherent risks, covert action, rightly or wrongly, has long been seen as a potential "silver bullet". 56 Judging the effectiveness of covert action is notoriously difficult and lies beyond the scope of this article. 57 What is important here is that regardless of quantified success, or in spite of apparent failures and limitations, British governments have consistently turned to covert action -it often proved too tempting not to. Doing so is a consequence of legitimising the great power discourse.
Covert action can and does bypass economic constraints. Threats may be a constant in international relations but, as strategists such as Colin Gray argue, interventionism 'is affected all the time by policy, strategy, and resource limitations.' 58 Like intelligence more broadly, covert action is a form of state power, analogous to economic or military power. 59 It can also be a force multiplier allowing the execution of policy using fewer resources, fewer "boots on the ground", and with fewer casualties. 73 and the 'dependency on internationally sanctioned mandates' is 'less than absolute' when using covert action. 74 As At the international political level, political elites see covert action as bolstering the Anglo-American relationship. British defence and security capabilities are seemingly of diminishing value to US policymakers and an unequal but inevitable military partnership can no longer be assumed. 76 Intelligence is an exception in which British expertise can allow the government to punch above its weight. For example, the 2010 SDSR emphasised the need to 'enhance the vital intelligence contribution to the bilateral relationship' and prioritised 'focus on areas of comparative national advantage valued by key allies, especially the United
States, such as our intelligence capabilities and highly capable elite forces'. 77 
SIS, Special
Forces, and GCHQ are three areas in which the British contribute to an increasingly unequal alliance, and, just as Harold Macmillan attempted in the late 1950s, drive an element of interdependence into the relationship.
Covert action certainly has its weaknesses and limitations; not least including dangers of unintended consequences, mission creep, and exposure. Nonetheless, it forms a seductive means to resolve -or at least conceal -the responsibility/capability disconnect:
to try to realise the ideational construct of a global role in the face of growing constraints.
Military and political leaders, often at loggerheads, now agree on the benefits of flexible and deniable interventionism. 78 It is of little surprise therefore that successive defence reviews have sought to enhance Special Forces and intelligence capabilities, 79 for tasks, as we shall see in the next section, often involving disruption operations. Indeed, the 2015 SDSR strongly emphasised the preventative and disruptive role of intelligence and Special Forces throughout, placing it, as a force multiplier, at the heart of British thinking. Having established the ideational appeal or motivation, this article will now demonstrate the role covert action can potentially play and where it is deemed a useful alternative to overt interventionism.
The Functional: Disruption, Fusion and the Rise of the "Fixers"
Intelligence actors, alongside Special Forces, attempt to fix or disrupt potential threats.
Scholars, such as Alastair Finlan, have long argued that changes in both the international environment and the British defence community have made the future bright for Special
Forces, and that they will 'continue to be the "force of choice" for swift and unorthodox state responses to perceived threats.' 80 Whilst true, this is only half the story. Charles
Cogan, a former senior CIA officer turned scholar, has persuasively argued that 'intelligence operatives in the twenty-first century will become hunters not gatherers. They will not simply sit back and gather information that comes in, analyse it and then decide what to do about it.' 81 A desire to help fill the gap between perceived responsibilities and capabilities has, in part, driven this active turn; so too has the nature of the threats and the climate in which they are faced. Both have caused a preference for pragmatic and preventative disruptive action designed to counter threats and manage uncertainty at source -before they escalate into a serious problem. Indeed, the security establishment has long recognised the dangers of insecurity and risk, often at the expense of a 'unified, hegemonic national interest'. 82 Given that the 'active management' of risk involves averting speculative scenarios rather than attaining specific outcomes, 83 covert action potentially offers a means of anticipatory self-defence and action before proof of harm. 84 This is necessary, for example, in countering terrorism. Rather than ambitiously seeking to rebuild nations, it, if used wisely, offers a light footprint, obviates the burdens of victory, and disrupts hostile groups before they can attack. Like any means of policy execution, covert action also has limitations (both practically and in terms of democratic legitimacy) and must be properly managed and coordinated, 85 but the appeal in the current international climate remains strong. GCHQ, however, can discredit a target more covertly. For example, it recommends 'writing a blog purporting to be one of their victims.' Another capability, codenamed CHANGELING, involves the 'ability to spoof any email address and send email under that identity'. GCHQ can also change a target's photos on a social networking site -a move it boasts 'can take "paranoia" to a whole new level.' Other ways GCHQ can manipulate targets in order to disrupt or discredit include the 'ability to artificially increase traffic to a website' (GATEWAY), 'to inflate page views on websites' (SLIPSTREAM), and to 'change [the] outcome of online polls' (UNDERPASS). 112 As noted above, the American National Security Agency suggested that Cameron has long turned to these capabilities in Syria. 113 Driven by the need for preventative action (or the 'active management' of risk), disruption extends beyond counter-terrorism to other contemporary threats too. As Richard Aldrich argues, a globalised world has forced governments to 'place their intelligence and security services in the front line against a range of elusive but troublesome opponents,' again leading to a proactive intelligence community. 114 The proliferation of WMD, for example, requires preventative disruption, alongside a broader range of counterproliferation measures including law enforcement and multilateral activity. SIS has had success at this. John Sawers, its former Chief, admitted that SIS ran a series of covert operations to 'slow down' Iranian development. 115 Similarly, the Butler Review into
Weapons of Mass Destruction hinted at SIS action to disrupt North Korean development in the 1990s. 116 The same can be said for organised crime, against which GCHQ's false blogs have been successful, 117 as well as risks emanating from mass migration. Indeed, Cameron has tasked intelligence personnel with disrupting human trafficking networks in the Mediterranean. 118 Again, this broadens our understanding of contemporary covert action beyond the constraints of the evidence bias allowing insight into other sensitive areas.
Like counter-terrorism, in all these cases the nature of the threat, rightly or wrongly, invites covert action. Objective assessments of efficacy are difficult, and covert action does have inherent weaknesses, but it is clear that policymakers are turning to such operations.
On one hand, these threats are difficult to counter entirely overtly. On the other hand, they require preventative management. The aim is to disrupt or fix a potential threat before it reaches British shores, thereby quietly bypassing constraints against overt intervention and even preventing the responsibility/capability disconnect from arising in the first place. It is a potentially virtuous circle -and one which appeals to policymakers. Although it may yet prove ambitious, this was demonstrated in the 2015 SDSR which recognised that intelligence agencies are able to reduce 'the likelihood of threats materialising' through disruptive action. 119 Whilst encouraging a more active intelligence approach, the diffuse and elusive nature of these threats simultaneously constrains larger more ambitious covert actions.
Historically, British covert action focused on elites: on kings, generals, tribal chiefs, and opposition leaders. This is now out of date. As recent international events have highlighted and governments recognised, the UK operates in a networked world in which traditional political authority carries less agency than fifty years ago. In an era of mass communication, social movements, and grassroots change, there are more variables to control and it is far harder to affect manageable change. 120 Again therefore, the available evidence suggests that covert action is taking place at the tactical level and attempting to disrupt or prevent threats rather than instigate regime change or engage in longer term activity. This applies not only to militaristic special operations, but to influence and technical operations too.
Having demonstrated why policymakers perceive covert action as appealing, this article will now argue that existing Whitehall structures enable covert action too.
The Bureaucratic: A Permissive Climate
Demonstrating the interplay between internal and external factors, Whitehall possesses a climate conducive for using intelligence and Special Forces actors to shape events. Increased political and legal scrutiny does not necessarily prevent operations. It may well curtail ambitious operations, but it has less impact on disruption or discrediting, which are less risky and provocative. This is because 'other tasks' are a legally avowed function of SIS and GCHQ, 121 whilst Section Seven of the Intelligence and Security Act (known in the press as the "James Bond clause") protects intelligence officers from prosecution for otherwise illegal actions anywhere in the world, so long as they were signed off by the Secretary of State. 122 Indeed, much to civil liberties campaigners' perpetual disappointment, the 1994 legislation was actually rather permissive. SIS and GCHQ now have less to fear from exposure and simply have to show that their covert operations were proportionate and had been properly ratified. 123 We In 2010, Cameron created the National Security Council, further enhancing the permissive environment for covert action. It provides a mechanism to task, scrutinise, and coordinate such activity. It does so in three ways. First, the NSC sits at the heart of the Whitehall intelligence and security world. It drives the intelligence community's work and, symptomatic of the growing centrality of intelligence over recent decades, offers an unparalleled interaction with policy. It institutionalises regular contact between senior policymakers and the intelligence chiefs, thereby naturally offering a useful framework for the discussion of covert action. Iain Lobban, then head of GCHQ, believed that the NSC is 'one of the best things this government has done' because it 'takes the sentiment in the room and translates it into tasking for each organisation'. 128 Institutionalised contact between the core executive and the heads of SIS and GCHQ has resulted in the latter being asked to disrupt, sabotage, or "fix" a certain problem. 129 Two recent examples of this include Cameron's instruction to intelligence and Special Forces to hunt down so-called "Jihadi John", 130 and SIS's bungled attempt to make contact with Libyan rebels which the Foreign Secretary blamed on 'pressure from ministers' to do something. 1960s) . 132 In all three cases, Cabinet Office machinery has provided a forum to set a framework for covert action and to task the intelligence agencies. Third, it is difficult to thrive in Whitehall's Darwinian jungle. In order to do so, government bodies constantly seek to remove constraints on their performance, the most prominent of which are budgetary and personnel cuts. 133 It is entirely predictable that in an era of austerity, SIS would appeal to the Prime Minister's desire for action; especially when operating in an environment where they are regularly in institutionalised contact. Closely attuned to policy needs and priorities, SIS now has a perfect forum for event-shaping operations. 134 Evidence of this is already emerging. The NSC has, for example, apparently approved a 'kill list' of individuals to be targeted 'as a last resort'. 135 Before then, covert action in Libya was overseen by the NSC machinery. This involved operations to develop the rebels' embryonic ground forces, including dispatching an advisory team and building up a longerterm train and equip project. The National Security Council's sub-committee on Libya met over sixty times during the conflict to consider both strategic and tactical matters and was accompanied by an official equivalent. Importantly, policymakers and intelligence chiefs debated the scope and possibilities of covert action around the NSC table. It provided a forum in which SIS, GCHQ, and Special Forces could be tasked. 136 Again however, it promoted tactical level, or short term, covert action, not least because real-time communications allow senior politicians to become more operationally involved. 137 Moreover, regarding Special Forces at least, 'short-term operational requirements have tended to trump more long-term' alternatives. A more ambitious scale leads to an increase in personnel -and a decrease in quality. 138 This inevitably prioritises the disruption and preventative operations outlined above.
At the same time, British review and oversight mechanisms are comparatively weak.
The ISC has long been criticised for being founded as a statutory 'committee of parliamentarians' selected by, and reporting to, the Prime Minister rather than a parliamentary committee. Moreover, it traditionally had limited powers to acquire sensitive information, lacked adequate resources, and was initially seen as overly deferential to the intelligence agencies. 139 Perhaps most importantly regarding covert action, it was charged with examining policy, rather than operational or 'individual cases'. 140 Aside from select committee statements, evidence of this weakness can be found in two other areas. First, ISC reports offer little discussion of covert action beyond an acknowledgement that it is undertaken. The only exception was a brief paragraph on the failure in Libya which merely blamed ministers for demanding quick action and praised SIS's ability to learn lessons. 143 Second, the Americans appreciated Britain's weak oversight system when considering the UK's value in the "special intelligence relationship". 144 This was, as the Snowden documents revealed, certainly the case regarding intelligence collection, but it has also extended to covert action. The CIA valued British assistance in the covert support to the Mujahedeen in the 1980s Afghan-Soviet war, for example. One reason was because British legal restrictions were looser, especially compared to the postWatergate climate in which the CIA operated. 145 Similarly, the American system of authorising covert action is more rigid than the British. Under the 1991 Intelligence Authorisation Act, Congress must be informed through a written presidential finding. This is not the case in the UK. There is a difference between scrutiny and coordination on the one hand and ex post facto oversight on the other. The latter is comparatively weak, giving SIS room to manoeuvre; but the former is reasonably strong, thereby ensuring SIS operations are not "rogue elephants" and limited to disruptive operations less likely to escalate.
Conclusions
The United Kingdom engages in covert action. The available evidence suggests that this is generally of a pragmatic, small scale, and disruptive nature, taking place predominantly at the tactical level. The context from which this is emerging is important in so far as it shapes and enables such covert action. The idea of a global role remains a key driver of British policy, but the execution of this is hamstrung by economic, political, and military constraints. This creates a gap between perceived responsibilities and capabilities;
ideational construct and material reality. Despite potential weakness and limitations of covert action, successive governments have long seen it as a means of resolving this and, as constraints intensify, David Cameron is following suit.
At a functional level, current threats necessitate a preventative and flexible response designed to disrupt problems before they materialise. The past decade has witnessed a growing fusion between intelligence and Special Forces, as well as intelligence personnel working proactively and operationally in their own right. At the bureaucratic level, and demonstrating interplay between internal and external factors, the domestic machinery is conducive for such activity. SIS, GCHQ and Special Forces are permitted to engage in authorised operations overseas, the National Security Council presents a powerful forum in which to task intelligence agencies, whilst oversight is comparatively weak. These factors combined create an atmosphere permissive to small scale, less provocative covert action, including disruption and discrediting operations. The fluidity of the international environment and greater scrutiny act against longer-term more ambitious activity. Indeed, the 2015 SDSR consistently recognised the importance of intelligence in 'disrupting threats'. 146 Covert action forms a broad toolkit. This article has not intended to suggest that all forms will be applicable in every circumstance. It is not the case, for example, that online covert action will plug a military gap. Instead, this article has contested that covert action is seen as both allowing the maintenance of a global role with fewer resources and capabilities and (theoretically) preventing future threats from materialising, thereby preventing the need to face such constraints in the first place. It is not necessarily arguing that covert action will successfully achieve this. Indeed, covert action is a risky means of executing policy and involves a range of limitations, from "blowback" to escalation, and must be properly managed, coordinated, and integrated into overt policies. This article merely argues that covert action forms an attractive instrument of national power and one which merits proper consideration.
The evidence is already beginning to mount. Taken together it is persuasive. But it is almost entirely absent from existing public debates. Acknowledgement in academia and by government that the UK engages in this sort of activity is only a first step. There are now debates to be had on the definitions and framework of British covert action, on effective scrutiny and authorisation processes, on effective oversight mechanisms, on the strengths, weaknesses, efficacy, and ethics of covert action, and on how it can best be used to counter international threats such as terrorism which feature so heavily in current policy. 9 In the interests of space limitation and theoretical parsimony, considerations of whether or not covert action is necessarily the most suitable, successful, or morally appropriate response to individual situations lie beyond the scope of this article. It limits its argument to that of policymakers increasingly turning to covert action. 10 See for example, Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, 'National Defence in the Age of Austerity', International
